Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Semantic content, philosophy: semantic content is an expression for what is attributed to the truth or falsehood of statements by the meanings of the expressions used, in contrast to sensory influences. See also semantics, compositionality, perception, truth, truth-maker._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David Chalmers on Semantic Content - Dictionary of Arguments
I 173 Phenomenal Judgments/Chalmers: phenomenal judgments are the core of the relationships between cognition and consciousness. These are verbal expressions of assertions about consciousness. >Consciousness, >Cognition, >Judgments. I 174 Judgment/Chalmers: judgement can be taken as what I and my zombie twin have in common. >Zombies, cf. >Twin Earth. Semantic content/Chalmers: semantic content, on the other hand, is formed partly by conscious experiences themselves (e.g., beliefs about sensations of red). The judgments of the zombies have only the same form as my reports, they have no content. >Sensations, >Experience, >Qualia. I 175 I can only refer to the judgments of the zombies in a deflationist manner ((s) purely quoting). Vgl. >Deflationism. Content/Chalmers: content can only be added by phenomenal beliefs, but it is unclear what role consciousness plays. >Content, >Consciousness, >Phenomena. Phenomenal Judgments/Chalmers: 1st level: phenomenal judgements concern the objects of experience. This is about awareness. >Awareness/Chalmers. I 176 2nd level: Judgments on conscious experiences. E.g. I note that I have an experience of something red. Such judgments can also be about kinds of experiences. 3rd Level: is about conscious experiences as a type of experience. E.g. about the fact that we have conscious experiences at all and how this can be explained. I 177 Problem: Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but judgments have to be explained like this because they are in the field of psychology. Paradoxically, consciousness is ultimately irrelevant to the explanation of phenomenal judgments. (Avshalom Elitzur (1989)(1), Roger Shepard (psychologist, 1993) (2). >Reduction/Chalmers. 1. A. Elitzur, Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10, 1989,: pp. 1-20. 2. R. N. Shepard, On the physical baisis, ölinguistic representation and conscious experiences of colors. In: G. Harman (Ed) Conceptions of the human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller, Hillsdale NJ 1993._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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> Counter arguments against Chalmers
> Counter arguments in relation to Semantic Content
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28